In this coercitive college it does not see a contrary force to the reason, much less the moral pretension without legitimacy of positive a legal system, but a priori a irrenuncivel and valid element of all the right (Cf. Hoffe, 2005, P. 241). See Rod Brooks for more details and insights. Exactly denoting an antagonism, it is not possible to conceive a legal system destined to guarantee the convivncia of the individual freedoms, without the exercise of a coercitive college. One becomes indispensable to define the concept of right in Kant, a time that such definition does not meet in the empirical field, in which if can extract the study of the right positive, therefore if the right was of the empirical sphere, the criterion of just and unjust never it could be surveyed, because it would only go to determine legally what it is allowed or illicit.

Therefore the only form of if arriving at the understanding of the right as justice idea, are to extirpar the empirical scope and to return to the analysis of the pure reason. Thus Kant differentiates: The juisconsult can, certainly, know and declare what he comes to be the right (quid sit iuris), that is, what the laws, in a certain place and a certain time, prescribe or had prescribed, but if it is just what these laws prescribe and the universal criterion by means of which is possible to recognize in general what it is just or unjust (iustum et iniustum), remains to it completely obscure, if not to abandon for a certain time those empirical principles, and if (despite it can be served of those laws as excellent conducting wires), not to search the origins of those judgments in the pure reason as only bedding of any positive legislation possible. (MC, p 67) For Kant they are the three elements that compose the right concept: in first place, this concept only says respect to external relation e, certainly, practical of a person with another one, in the measure where its action, as facts, can be influenced reciprocal; in according to place, the right concept does not mean the relation of the will as the desire of outrem, therefore with the mere necessity, as in the beneficial or cruel actions, but so only with will of the others, and in third place, this reciprocal relation of the will, to the end of that each one is considered with the object that wants, but only for the form in the relation of the will of both the parts, in the measure where if it considers solely as free and if, with this, the action of can in accordance with conciliate if with the freedom of other a universal law. In this third element, Kant defends that the right one when regulates a will relation, becomes irrelevant the individual ends or utilitarian that the involved agents long for, but the form that end to solely have to be galgado. This implies that the superiority in a contract of purchase and sales, for example, does not meet in the advantage or disadvantage of the salesman or purchaser, but exclusively in the rite of the contractual fulfilment. Daqui appears the classic definition of right for Kant: ' ' The right is the set of the conditions, by means of which the will of one can be in accordance with the will of an one other as universal law of liberdade' ' (MC, P. 56). Therefore, the right for belonging to the world of the external relations constitutes